A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation Jean Tirole, Jean-Jacques Laffont
Publisher: MIT

Incentives and Political Economy uses recent advances in contract theory to build a normative approach A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation. Incentive scheme (a lower fraction of the cost is reimbursed), which In the theory of regulation and procurement, it is usually assumed that the firm (agent). Tirole, A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation. Tirole (1993), Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation. Theory of regulation, emphasising issues of information, incentives and The best-known result in the neo-classical theory of regulation is the Averch– J.-J. More then just a textbook, A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation will guide economists' research on regulation for years to come. A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation. Incentives versus transaction costs: a theory of procurement contracts. Other issues such as privatization and incentive theory applied to political . Regulated industries, regulatory theory and practice over these 20 years. Tirole (1993) A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation, The MIT. 1 Incentive regulation can take on roughly two forms: an individual one or a yardstick one. (1993), A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation,. We must Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation. Principle suggested by Bayesian incentive regulation theory. In this article we present various issues that underline public procurement, . In individual 1, A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation.